1-2007

Globalization, the Developmental State, and the Politics of Urban Growth in Korea: A Multilevel Analysis

Yooil BAE
Singapore Management University, yooilbae@smu.edu.sg

Jefferey M. SELLERS
University of Southern California

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00737.x

Globalization, the Developmental State and the Politics of Urban Growth in Korea

A Multilevel Analysis

Yooil Bae

Von KleinSmid Center, Room 327
Department of Political Science
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90089-0044
USA
Email Address: ybae@usc.edu
Phone: (818) 548-4243

and

Jefferey M. Sellers

Von KleinSmid Center, Room 327
Department of Political Science
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90089-0044
USA
Email Address: sellers@usc.edu
Phone: (213) 740-1684

Word Count
8,520

Globalization, the Developmental State and the Politics of Urban Growth in Korea
A Multilevel Analysis

ABSTRACT

This article explores the politics of urban growth in a transitional society. Korea, which is experiencing rapid industrialization, urbanization and democratic transition exemplifies a set of conditions that might seem to favor the emergence of an urban growth politics and business-led growth coalition much like that found in urban areas at the time of industrialization, and still prevalent in much of the US and other western democracies today. Yet our multilevel case analyses show that the transformations in Korea as a late industrializer, late democratizer and late adopter of urban policy have helped to consolidate more restricted policies toward urban growth than in the US or much of Europe. Multilevel analysis that highlights dynamics at global and national as well as local levels illuminates why the growth politics of a transitional society like Korea resembles as well as differs from that of older industrialized democracies.

Across Western Europe and North America over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a massive migration of population toward urban centers along with industrialization and economic growth. Despite variations by country and by region, the predominant urban political-economic pattern throughout the industrialized world was one of urban growth and economic development. This paradigm was especially pervasive and deeply rooted in postwar American city politics. A longstanding U.S. literature has highlighted how 'place-based' urban elites and coalitions - usually business-led - drove urban initiatives to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth. Molotch (1976:310) went so far as to contend that the political and economic essence of the city was 'growth.' Up until the 1980s, when new urban issues such as post-industrialism and environmentalism emerged, coalition building process over the control of land use to attract new economic development stood at the center of urban political debates. Growth machine and urban regime analyses provided the two most prominent strands among a large set of theories that sought to explain coalition building through its links to urban development politics (Harding, 1994).

Following rapid industrialization and urbanization in many developing countries since the 1960s, the accumulation of capital and resources within cities has brought parallel issues of growth and sustainable development to the fore. At the same time that transitional societies have experienced economic prosperity and urban growth, socio-economic change there has brought about the rise of urban middle class, and political change has contributed to the emergence of citizen groups and democratic politics (Park et al., 1999; Shatkin, 2004; Wu, 2003; Zhang, 2002). A number of accounts suggest that local business elites and economic organizations are crucial to economic development

and local growth in developing and transitional societies, but in a different and distinctive manner from in North America and Western Europe (Evans, 2002; Wu, 2003). Closer scrutiny of urban dynamics in these societies needs to take account of major contextual contrasts in capitalist systems, state-society relations, the nature of local businesses, and the temporal context of urban policy (Clark, 2000; Evans, 2002).

The Korean case exemplifies a set of conditions that might seem to favor the emergence of an urban growth politics much like that found in rapidly expanding urban areas at the time of industrial growth, and still prevalent in much of the United States today. Alongside democratization and decentralization, the rapid industrialization and urban growth in cities might appear to foster the emergence of business-led growth coalition and a basis in favor of continued development. Yet, in fact, the transformations in the Korean economy, politics and society have helped to consolidate more restricted policies toward urban growth than in the United States or much of Europe. Only a closer examination of transformations at national and local levels in Korea, with due consideration to the shifting global context, can fully illuminate why.

Urban growth politics in transitional societies: an analytical framework

Much of the growing amount of international comparative research on urban growth politics has simply mapped growth and anti-growth coalitions like those of many U.S. settings in a very different context. A full understanding of why these models differ, as regulation theorists have argued (cf. Lauria, 1997), must take into account a far-reaching set of national, local and even global variables (Sellers, 2002a). For societies

undergoing vast recent transformations, such as Korea, processes of industrialization, democratization and urban policy development as well as the comparatively late timing of these processes in relation to other developed countries need to be taken into account.

Urban growth coalition and growth machine theory from the United States outline several crucial sets of actors (Harding, 1995; Logan and Molotch, 1987). 1. Rentier and other business interests support urban economic and property development. 2. Public officials (mainly local) play an important but often secondary role in support of business interests. 3. Local residents assert use values and residential property values against new economic and property development. Another variant on this account, urban regime analysis, has largely reaffirmed this mapping of local actors and interests even as it differs as to the explanation of it (Stone, 1989). With occasional exceptions, the U.S. authors have generally portrayed pro-growth coalitions as dominant.

Comparative analysis of recent growth politics in other developed countries, mostly in Western Europe, has often pointed out important limitations to this portrayal. In parts of Europe, more statist system of local government and local political economy, stronger national political organizations, more extensive national land use and transportation policies and an array of other differences have often shifted the balance of local interests in favor of constraints on urban development (Fainstein, 2001; Levine, 1994; Sellers, 2002a). Even in the U.S. some analysts point to emerging post-industrial forms of urban growth politics that have created local business interests in the quality of life that qualify those in urban development (Clark, 2000).[1] Yet most such comparative

[1] Cities in advanced economies more and more attempt to attract workers in high-tech and service industries rather than traditional manufacturing industries. Because those workers value residential environment and quality of life such quality of environment, safety, malls, parks, education, and so forth, maintaining these environmental standards in the cities is very important to attract the workers (Sellers,

analysis remains confined to developed societies that, like the U.S., experienced transformations like industrialization, democratization, and the accompanying rapid urbanization long before the late twentieth century.

As a rare recent case of these transformations, Korea offers an important source of insight into the meaning that these transformations are likely to have for the politics of urban growth in other developing countries. With explicit attention to these transformations and their implications, theories from U.S. settings can shed light on the recent politics of urban growth in Korea. A closer look at the applicability of these theories, however, suggests reasons why this politics might differ from as well as resemble the patterns from the United States.

a. Late industrialization and the developmental state: continuity and change

The extraordinary economic success of East Asian countries – especially Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - in the postwar period raises both scholarly and practical inquiries regarding the question, "How did those 'backward' countries accomplish such unprecedented fast economic growth, although in fact, the fundamentals of their industrialization strategies and policies were similar to other developing countries?" (Amsden, 1989; Gerschenkron, 1962). The conventional argument regarding East Asian economic miracle was that the countries faithfully followed market principles in their industrialization process. However, in truth, tremendous economic growth in these countries resulted from a different pattern of management of institutions on which rapid industrialization was based. Unlike earlier industrializers such as the UK and the US,[2] the

---

2000: 120).

[2] Pempel (1999) characterized the UK and the US in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries as a

strong state intervention in the markets of these late-developing countries worked exceptionally well to subsidize, monitor, and guide the private sector in achieving economic growth (Amsden, 1989; Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1995).

Britain, Germany and the United States which experienced industrial revolution in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries relied upon continuous 'invention and innovation' of technological knowledge. In contrast, backward countries in the twentieth century did not have such foundations and resources of technological advancement. Those which succeeded in transforming their industrial and economic structure to raise productivity employed 'borrowed' knowledge from the earlier industrializers (Amsden, 1989). In applying this knowledge to the development of production technology and capital resources, these countries relied upon the intervention of a powerful state (Gershenkron, 1962; Hill and Kim, 2000).

As developmental state theorists have argued, highly-educated and experienced state bureaucrats mobilized and allocated resources to firms selected for their competitive advantage against industries in advanced countries - especially export-oriented companies (Evans, 1992).[3] Bureaucrats were not only executors of the will of lawmakers but setters of national goals and standards, and the standards they set drew upon international experience (Pempel, 1999; Woo-Cumings, 1995). As Gershenkronian theorists pointed out, states took on the risks that individual capitalists avoided in launching firms and industry in international markets. By doing so, late industrializers

---

"regulatory state," which meant that the states defined their principal function as setting basic rules for guaranteeing fair competition in the market and mediating private disputes.

[3] The bureaucrats disciplined firms with centralized resources, gave favor to companies showing good performance, and organized crucial aspects of the market for them (Amsden, 1989).

rapidly emerged in the global market place that advanced economies had established, and posed strong challenges to them with cheaper labor forces and competitive products.

Parallel to accounts of the Japanese economic miracle from the 1950s to the 1960s, work on Korea also demonstrates how ubiquitous and highly capable bureaucrats controlled the national finance and monetary system through the Economic Planning Bureau (EPB) and the Korea Bank. In particular, EPB set up an economic policy. 'Five Year Economic Development Plans' every five years during the industrialization period (1960s-1980s) provided administrative and financial aids to highly competitive export-oriented industries.[4] In the process, cities such as Seoul and Pusan became growth poles where socio-economic infrastructure for further industrial development was concentrated (Chung and Kirby, 2002; Hill and Kim, 2000).

In responding to the globalizing economy, the East Asian countries have moved to shed some of the state-led industrial organizations and practice of the past. Greater openness to global markets has constrained the state's range of options for dealing with domestic economic problems (Pempel, 1999). Thus, postwar Japanese, Korean, and other developmental state models have been under strain, and policymakers in those countries have been actively searching for avenues for reform since the 1990s. Above all, they have been compelled to shift from traditional manufacturing industries into more knowledge-and-technology-based sectors that are not as compatible with a state-led economic growth (Hahm and Plein, 1995). With the shift in global economic activities to the Asian Pacific region since the early 1990s, the Korean government's strategy changed to promoting high-tech industries (Chung and Kirby, 2002: 125). The early period of export-oriented

[4] In addition, the government maintained a low interest rate, made public investment in research and development, established export-supporting institutions, and so forth (World Bank, 1993).

industrialization and the developmental state began to break apart, even as its legacy remained deeply embedded in the politico-economic structure of the country (Moon and Prasad, 1994).

These national and international politico-economic transformations had potentially ambiguous implications for urban development politics. Especially in the era of export-led development, the state assembled an array of powers and resources in its own hands. Even in the subsequent era of more decentralized economic policy, the legacies of the developmental state could be expected to color relations with business and rentier interests. At the same time, as a late industrializer, Korea mobilized intensively around economic development. Even in the later phase, as the national political economy focused on high-tech and service development like that of other developed economies, one might expect this mobilization to predominate.

b. Transition to democracy

Along with a host of other countries around the world, Korea comprised a part of the "third wave" of international democratization during the 1980s and 1990s. Especially in Korea and Taiwan, the practice of democratic governance was late, because the legacy of Japanese colonial rule produced a lengthy period of authoritarian dominance. However, unprecedented world economic growth and the end of Cold War promoted circumstances in which a liberal democracy was likely to take root – e.g. high-level of living standard and education, and middle class in urban regions and civic activism (Huntington, 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). The democratic transition in 1987 would have far-reaching consequences as well.

First, there were an entire series of fundamental changes in governing institutions. Direct presidential election and the process of amendment of the Constitution were constitutionally guaranteed, and several basic political rights such as freedom of press and speech, freedom of association and assembly, and so forth were substantially promoted, and notorious restrictions on human rights and liberty were abolished.[5] In addition, local government reform in 1991 and 1994 through the enactment of Local Autonomy Act diversified political channels for local society to the power centers. In 1995 with the establishment of the elected mayors and council members, local officials who had formerly implemented the central government's policies acquired autonomous decision-making powers.[6]

Second, democratic value and cultural change in the Korean mass public furnished additional resources for democratic consolidation. Pressures and challenges from below for democratic governance had helped bring about democratization (Flanagan and Lee, 2000). With this goal achieved, civic activism was channeled into advocacy movements focused on diverse policy issues (Kim, 2000). Democratization awoke the middle-class groups at both national and local levels, and the political voices of citizens gradually increased.

The links of changes in the local context to democratization are difficult to separate out from the politico-economic mechanisms. However, it seems clear that even as democratic changes, decentralization and elections could have ambiguous implications for growth politics at the local level. Local movements against growth could not only be

[5] The Constitution, Article 10-39.

[6] The practice of local democracy - i.e. local elections and full-fledged local autonomy - has been constitutionally mandated since 1948, but military rules from 1960s to 1980s ignored it (Oh, 1999: 152-161).

mobilized but empowered. At the same time, however, local officials facing elections might find new reasons to pursue economic development that could bring jobs and amenities for their citizens.

c. Late development of urban policy

Because industrialization took place late in Korea, so did the process of rapid urbanization that had usually accompanied industrial development. National policy choices about such issues as infrastructure, placement of new urban residences and the shaping of urban land use thus took place after parallel policies in much of the developed world had already been established. As a result, Korean policymakers could draw on well-tested models from other countries.

In making these choices, the Korean regime of the 1960s-1970s put into place a set of policies that looked largely like those carried out in the UK following World War II. A key strategy for the control of land use in metropolitan regions was the Green Belt that facilitated the containment of agricultural and recreation area, and regulated new development.[7] With the rapid expansion of urban population and territory (see Figure 1), urban and regional planning in the 1970s focused on restricting urban sprawl and intensifying the utilization of inner cities (Chung and Kirby, 2002). In order to control urban sprawl, the Restricted Development Zone (or Green Belt) was introduced in 1971, which strictly managed the expansion of metropolitan areas until contemporary Korea (Kwon, 2001). Although Japan failed to implant the concept of restricted development in the 1960s, the Korean government successfully implemented the British model of Green

[7] The concept of green belt was introduced in the Greenbelt Act of 1938, and practiced in Greater London Development Plan (Atkinson and Moon, 1994).

Belt under the authoritarian regime.[8] With the rapid democratization and the shift toward local developmental strategies, it is easy to imagine that the Green Belt policy could have been scrapped to make way for emerging local development across the country. Yet the rise of civic activism after the democratic transition in urban areas in Korea in fact led to reinforcement of growth management policies that were adopted in authoritarian rule. The land use controls took on a new political role as resources for a successful growth management movement and citizen lawsuits against the pursuit of development.

[Insert Figure 1 around here]

As a late economic developer, late democratizer, and late adopter of urban policy, Korea as a nation thus stood in a different relation to the global context of urban development than the U.S. or Europe during the same period. The conditions that the national context of policies, institutions and other conditions imposed for urban development politics differed in turn. To demonstrate the ultimate effects on the dynamics and outcomes of growth politics, it will be helpful to examine how these influences played out in a specific case.

Growth politics and multilevel change in a Korean city

The evolution of growth politics in Korean cities manifests the impact of these global, national and cultural influences. Korean cities experienced rapid expansion of

[8] A total of 5,397㎢ of Korean territory (5.4%) was designated as Green Belt area, despite the deregulations in the 1990s (Kwon, 2001).

urban areas and explosion of population in a relatively short period (Figure 1). After the democratic transition, popularly elected and empowered local politicians enthusiastically embrace local economic development. At the same time, local growth initiatives faced substantial institutional limitations from the central government. As negative consequences from rapid development became clear, growing challenges from civic activism mobilized around environmental quality. Multilevel analysis of the trajectory of growth politics in a single Korean city demonstrates the interplay among these diverse but interrelated influences.

[insert Figure 1 about here]

In the late 1980s, to relieve the heavy congestion and shortage of housing in Seoul, the Korean government announced a five-year plan to construct 2 million housing units (1988) and new towns within 25 kilometers of Seoul (1989). New town policy was first introduced in the postwar UK. The uncontrolled expansion of major cities in the UK resulted from the poorly planned industrialization of the nineteenth century, and the government felt the necessity to control suburban development for the dispersal of congested urban population (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). The New Towns Programme[9] aimed to disperse the population of inner cities. The population of major urban areas in the UK fell over the 1950s and 1960s. Although it was not clear how much of the dispersal was the effect of new towns, the program did contribute to this result (Kwon, 2001; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). For the Korean government of the 1980s, a similar program was perfectly suited to the parallel goal of alleviating the overcrowded

[9] The New Town Act of 1946 was the mother law of the programme, and the government appointed corporations to carry out the new town construction (Atkinson and Moon, 1994).

population in Seoul. Construction of new towns – e.g. Pundang, Il-san, Pyongchon, and Sanbon - was completed in the mid-1990s.[10]

The city of Koyang was one of the satellite cities that resulted. Consisting of two new towns – Il-san and Hwa-jeong districts – Koyang is located 20 kilometers northwest of Seoul. Before the national government announced the new town project in 1989, Koyang was only a small county that supplied agricultural products to Seoul residents. However, with the completion of construction of new towns, the population of the city grew rapidly in the 1990s (Figure 2). When the new towns in Koyang were completed around the mid-1990s, they became the most preferred residential areas to live in due to their natural suburban surroundings, absence of traffic congestion, and safe neighborhoods (Munhwa Dailynews Survey, 3 November, 1999). The new town policy and migration of population from Seoul metropolitan were smoothly implemented under the close guidance of the central government ministries, such as Ministry of Construction and Transportation and EPB.

[Insert Figure 2 around here]

With this background, the following cases of politics under local democracy show somewhat different patterns of urban growth politics from the central government-dominant model. Because Koyang was designated to become a satellite city to relieve Seoul population and its main function suddenly changed from agricultural area to residential town, it did not have the kind of socio-economic infrastructure in which

[10] Pundang and Il-san districts were the two largest new towns containing 165,000 housing units and a population of 650,000 (Ha, 1998).

production activity could occur.[11] The elected mayor and council members, facing fiscal difficulties with upcoming elections in mind, sought to attract firms and population with their newly given discretion and power. The resulting growth coalition became a powerful force for further development. At the same time, however, local interests in growth management gradually emerged to express their voices.

a. The Koyang International Exhibition Center (IEC) project

Up until the 1990s, Koyang remained an underserved satellite city without self-sufficient economic infrastructure. The construction of the Koyang International Exhibition Center (IEC), agreed in April of 1999, changed this. With the end to export-led industrialization initiatives, and Korean membership in the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1997), many industrial policies and subsidies that supported domestic industries were prohibited or restricted. As a consequence, commercial trade-oriented projects like the IEC became the most effective alternative to promote export-based industries.[12] In 1998, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) and Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) decided to construct a large-scale IEC to support companies located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area.[13] Koyang and Incheon stood out as strong candidates for the site of this facility due to their location, transportation, and infrastructure.

[11] For example, only 36% of Koyang residents had their jobs within the city, and 60% commuted to neighboring cities including Seoul (KRI, 1998).
[12] For example, German companies contract almost 80% of their exports through international trade exhibitions (29 April, 1999, Kyung-in Dailynews).
[13] This is because about 50% of manufacturing industries and 75% of high-tech industries are agglomerated around the SMA (Chung and Kirby, 2002).

Because it was expected that the construction of IEC would bring a tremendous economic effect on local economy, the competition to attract it was fierce between the two cities. The city would obtain a tax base reaching 27.6 million dollars per year, create 40,000-50,000 new jobs, and increase local economic production by 1.1 billion dollars per year, if the city attracted the IEC (May 1999, Koyang Newsletter). Accordingly, to local politicians and businesses, it represented a perfect chance to revive the local economy that had been suffering since the economic crisis of 1997.

At this time real estate in Koyang was undervalued. The city was literally a 'bedroom town' lacking social and industrial infrastructure. As a result, almost all interests in the city were eager to attract the IEC to Koyang. As Molotch (1976) mentioned, the city mobilized as a single entity around growth, and supralocal as well as local actors joined in support. National Assembly members who had their constituencies in Koyang districts and the governor and politicians of Kyeong-gi province became strong advocates. They lobbied, sent letters, and opened symposiums to attract the IEC. The city council established a special task force team, namely "Special Committee for Promoting Self-sufficiency of Koyang" (21 September, 1997), and the members sent several official letters which urged central politicians and bureaucrats to decide the location of the IEC to be Koyang. Local interest groups and new town residents were also strong supporters, arguing that real estate in Koyang was seriously undervalued because of the lack of industrial infrastructure.[14]

Against this backdrop Dong-Young Shin, the appointed mayor from 1992 who in 1997 won election to that office, became a core player in the growth politics of Koyang.

[14] As predicted, the price of the new town apartments and lands in Koyang substantially increased right after the attraction of the IEC (Hankyoreh Newspaper, 24 June, 1999).

As an elected mayor, he actively organized and mobilized his political resources and showed a strong willingness to keep the jobs and attract firms. His strategy was mainly one of making and drawing on political connections. First, because the authority to decide the location of the IEC was vested with central government agencies MOCIE and KOTRA, he made great efforts to work in conjunction with central government officials and politicians in pursuit of the attraction of the IEC. Fortunately, he belonged to the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) during his second and third mayoralty (1995-1999). The governor of Kyeong-gi province belonged to the same party. Through these connections, Mayor Shin could easily build lobbying channels and gain support from many National Assembly members.

Second, he mobilized potential and active proponent groups of urban growth policy within Koyang. He held several unofficial meetings with members of local chamber of commerce, small business associations, and landowner groups. Groups such as the Koyang Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Koyang Farmers League, the Committee on New Town Development, and the Association for Restoring Property Rights of Greenbelt were strong supporters. These groups had merged to form the Alliance for Koyang's Self-sufficing Economy (AKSE) in 1994. The constituents of this alliance were mainly land-based interest groups including landowners, developers, and local merchants. AKSE was an especially strong political group in Koyang, and it had attempted to obtain political power by having its members run for government positions, but failed every time.[15] Therefore, after several attempts, they tried to initiate a special tie

[15] Because of many restrictions on land-use in Koayng, - e.g. Military Facility Protection Act (MFPA), Green Belt, and Capital Region Planning Act (CRPA) - about 57% of city's territory and private property had been labeled "growth management area" with minimal monetary compensation from the government. Therefore, property-related interest groups became a strong proponent of urban development policy.

with local politicians and government leaders. Mayor Shin did not hesitate to establish a congenial relationship with this group. A mayor-centered growth coalition thus came to power, and ultimately proved critical to growth politics in Koyang. Even new town residents who are usually classified as potential opponents of urban growth in the urban politics literature joined forces for the attraction of the IEC.

With this mobilization of support at higher levels of government as well as within the city, Koyang won designation as the new location for the IEC. The growth politics in Koyang described in this case can be understood in several types of conditions. The model of the developmental state from 1960s-1980s continued to provide the incentives and tools for local economic development, even as developmental initiatives shifted toward more post-industrial, high-tech and service-oriented activitiies (Castells and Hall, 1994; Sassen, 2001). National land-use controls such as Green Belt, MFPA, and CRPA persisted as influences on local policymaking and development into the era of local democracy (Hill and Kim, 2000). But regardless of these regulations and restrictions on local politics, pro-growth coalitions proliferated. After the first local elections in 1995, an elected and empowered mayoralty became the key actor on behalf of local growth politics in the city.

b. Rezoning the agricultural area

As soon as Koyang attracted the IEC in April of 1999, the city government announced the new land-use plan, namely 'The Charter for Admission of Hotel Industry in Koyang Agricultural Area,' and submitted the bill to the city council (18 May, 1999). By rezoning agricultural area that composed 16% of Koyang territory, the government

attempted to raise the exchange value of old towns, revive local economy and tourism, and expand local tax base. According to the government, constructing numerous hotels was essential in order to host international-scale exhibitions after the completion of the new Koyang IEC. The plan would provide an equal opportunity to raise the value of old town properties that had been excluded from the benefit of development because of the several land-use regulations. Moreover, along with the attraction of the IEC, the project sought to dramatically alter the image of the city from that of a 'bedroom town' to a more service-oriented center of hotels, conventions, tourism, and a high-quality of urban life.

In 1997 controls over agricultural land, vested solely in the central government under the authoritarian regime, were devolved to the local governments under national supervision.[16] In light of such persistent land-use controls as the Military Facility Protection Act (MFPA) and the Capital Region Planning Act (CRPA), local rezoning of agricultural areas under this new authority emerged as the most suitable avenue for pursuit of new development.

Mayor Shin could easily mobilize pro-growth interests on behalf of rezoning by emphasizing the project's economic effects: a better neighborhood, healthy local economy, and effective land-use in old towns. Because old town residents and businesses had been excluded from the state-led development due to various land-use regulations such as Green Belt, MFPA, and CRPA, most of them belonged to the property-rights-related groups such as Alliance for Koyang's Self-sufficing Economy (AKSE) and strongly supported the project. They had several undisclosed and unofficial meetings with the mayor to support the bill, and the alliance between them and the city government

[16] In the National Land-Use Management Act of 1994, central government had deregulated the construction of lodging facilities in agricultural area, but re-regulated those lodging facilities by delegating the authority of permission of the hotel construction to the mayor in the revised law in 1997 (Article 15).

became a stable relationship in the process. Even after Mayor Shin died unexpectedly in 1999, his successor Mayor Kyosun Hwang continued in relentless pursuit of this project. In the process, legally required official hearings on the project were omitted. City council members from old town districts strongly supported the passage of the plan. On May 27, 1999, without serious discussion or investigation, the Council approved the project.

Unlike in the IEC case, however, there was a growing disagreement with the city's plan and there were skepticism about the economic effect of the hotel construction. (SAY FIRST WHO WAS SKEPTICAL AND BRIEFLY DISCUSS THEIR MOTIVES. THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE INTERESTING ENOUGH TO INCLUDE BUT SECONDARY TO OUR STORY.) According to the city's plan, fifteen to twenty medium-sized hotels would be admitted in the agricultural land, but for the skeptics, those size and numbers of hotels did not seem likely to be profitable or beneficial to the local economy. The estimated cost of construction of each hotel was about two or three million dollars, but from the skeptics' perspective, small construction companies in Koyang could not afford even this relatively low cost, and they were not comparable in terms of capability to national-level companies. In addition, the skeptics worried that those medium-sized hotels would create a negative image of the city because in Korea small or medium-sized lodging facilities were regarded as what is so called 'love hotels' where extra-matrimonial affairs usually took place. They worried that those hotels would damage their residential and educational environment as well as the image of the city.

At first, some environmental activists complained about the city's plan individually by pointing out the lack of public hearings and the illegality of the procedure. However, after the passage of the bill in the city council in May of 1999,

neighborhood organizations such as Koyang Citizen Association and New Town Residence Representatives eventually recognized the problems of the bill, and carried out neighborhood movements that became a collective resistance to the city's plan. Eventually these activists and neighborhood organizations formed a collective citizen movement organization, namely "the Committee for Protecting Residential Environment in Koyang," and several citizen, religious, advocacy organizations joined forces. Some city council members who were elected in new towns, Association for Koyang Christian Churches, Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Koyang Youth League, Koyang Women's Union the Committee of Parents for 'True' Education, and numerous other groups participated in this neighborhood movement. In addition to picketing and complaining directly, this collective action committee hired professionals in environment and urban planning, and held press conferences to inform the public and higher governments to challenge the government in more systematic and institutional manner. The groups attempted to bring a citizen lawsuit against the city officials, though public litigation was not yet permitted in Korea, and carried out a 10,000 signature-collecting campaign. Through several national-level mass media coverage highlighting the pitfall of the city's plan, this case of rezoning agricultural land received nation-wide attention, and neighborhood groups and non-profit organizations in other regions announced statements to support Koyang's citizen movement.

As a consequence of these efforts, the bill regarding rezoning of the agricultural lands was finally abolished in the city council in November 1999. (ADD A SENTENCE OR TWO ON WHAT ANTI-GROWTH TOOLS, GROUPS OR INITIATIVES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MOST DECISIVE FOR THIS RESULT.) In this case, the structure of

confrontation between pro-growth and anti-growth groups was clearly identified as growth machine theory argued, but there were also several differences. First, elected mayors pursued several development plans for the city, and in doing so effectively mobilized local businesses and property-related groups in old towns. Unlike in the US, local business associations and rentier groups[17] remained weak throughout this period, leaving capacities to pursue growth power centered in the mayor. Second, there was a rise of civic activism that valued the quality of life in the city, and especially new town residents who moved from SMA and were in the middle and well-educated class. These groups emerged as strong and effective proponents of constraints on growth.

c. Commercial and residential complex project

Before the development of new towns in Koyang, there were 27.4 acres of industrial lands in Baek-sok Dong area which was the gateway to Il-san district, one of the new towns in Koayng, and the city government initially had planned to attract large scale publishing companies on that land to be known as 'Publishing Industrial District.' The government had attempted to transform the city's industrial structure toward more cultural and service-oriented city. Under land-use regulations such as MFPA and CRPA that prohibited new-entry of pollution-causing factories and labor-intensive industries in the SMA, cultural or service-oriented industries such as publishing industry were alternatives to get around the those regulations. However, the government failed to attract publishing companies that were supposed to be established in Koyang in 1994, and thus Baek-sok Dong remained vacant for ten years since 1989.

[17] Unlike the 'rentiers' and developers in the growth machine, there were no big landowners and local businesses who could enjoy the benefit of the developments, and thus they had no choice but to form a coalition with the strong mayor.

Because leaving 27.4 acres of the city's gateway vacant was wasteful to the whole city, the government attempted to establish several development plans. In 1999, a national-level (PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?) construction company, Yojin Construction Co., contracted the Baek-sok Dong land for 53.6 million dollars, and the government allowed construction of a fifty-five-storied commercial-residential complex (hereafter the CRC). The CRC project included a 55-story building in Baek-sok Dong area, and new commercial facilities, malls, office spaces, and convention centers. The project would provide housing for 3,400 Korean households and additional thousand households for visitors.

Many landowners and residents in Baek-sok Dong area had complained that the area had remained undeveloped for an extended period after 1994. In a hearing of the urban planning committee in January 2000, Mayor Hwang forcefully asserted that the government could not leave the land undeveloped any more. He pointed to numerous problems that development in the area would address. It would improve the visual appearance of the city, compensate residents for economic losses from previous underdevelopment, and facilitate efficient land-use planning of the city. In addition, he argued that the CRC project would bring an increase in local government revenue. The urban planning department of the city contended that the project would generate over one billion dollars in local economic benefits, including 7.5 million dollars of government tax base, and 10 million dollars of profits to local businesses.

Because the city government's bill on rezoning agricultural land was halted, pro-growth actors tried to avoid conflict with anti-growth groups by following appropriate legal procedures. In addition to public hearings, conferences were held to discuss the

CRC project. In these meeting, advocates of pro-growth policy endorsed the new project. The CEO of Yojin emphasized the company's various experiences in urban development and constructions in Koyang[18], and promised that Yojin Town (the CRC) would build a stable local tax base, reduce unemployment rate by hiring local workers, and implement effective urban planning by consulting with officials. In addition, old town residents who lived nearby Baek-sok Dong, and whose properties had remained underdeveloped for over ten years, mobilized against the growth management activists. A newly formed "Residential Committee on Development of Baek-sok Dong" cooperated with the AKSE which was the strongest pro-growth interest in Koyang.

Civic activist groups supporting growth management had by now became much stronger, more engaged and more proactive in the policymaking processes. Initially uncoordinated, they gradually organized into a single coalition. Eleven citizen movement organizations including Koyang Citizen Association and Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) formed an umbrella group, called the "Citizen Committee for Opposing the CRC," which responded systematically to the pro-growth coalition. The group participated aggressively in the public hearings. Through several press conferences at both local and national levels, it marshaled support from various citizen movement organizations.[19] In hearings and press conferences, opponents brought forth professional experts to testify on inappropriate aspects of the project. They questioned what they portrayed as the hidden goals of the project. They circulated a

[18] Yojin Co. carried out several constructions such as malls in downtown Koyang, and thus was relatively well-known to the residents.

[19] For example, KFEM which was the most powerful and largest environmental movement organization with 43 local branches joined the citizen committee to support this neighborhood movement.

petition to higher governments and politicians for an abolishment of the city's plans for the project, and brought a citizen lawsuit against it.

Throughout these activities, opponents mustered an even broader array of arguments than they had against the agricultural rezoning. The large number of households to be added could possibly lead to overpopulation, straining service provision in the city. A national rather than a local company would assume control of development. Partly as a result, the project was not likely to bring a significant economic effect to Koyang's economy. As an alternative, opponents suggested that the city government attract high-tech related industries instead of the CRC.[20] In a separate environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the CRC, environmental experts commissioned by the opponents found that the city's EIA was not thoroughly executed to estimate the impact of the CRC on neighborhood environment and transportation (Donga Il-bo, 29 January, 2000). Inappropriate use of mayoral authority in Koyang also became a common target of the citizen movement organizations in the mass media coverage.

The increasingly organized confrontation between the pro-growth forces and anti-growth groups produced an impasse. The mayor had mustered a powerful coalition around a large-scale developmental agenda that could have a huge economic impact on the city. As in the case of the agricultural rezoning, old town residents and both local and national business were strong proponents of the development. Yet the challenges from a growing, increasingly sophisticated array of groups again drew on the national legislation and other resources to pose a major obstacle to development. The environmentalist and

[20] In addition to these various modes of civic activism, picketing, emailing and street demonstrations were widely used in the process.

neighborhood movements had now mobilized more broadly and organized more effectively.

d. Discussion

These three cases in the analysis demonstrate a gradual evolution in the politics of urban development in Korea from the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. . Koyang as it exists today is a product of the decision of the authoritarian central government of the 1980s to develop new towns outside the Seoul Metropolitan Areas to relieve overpopulation and environmental degradation. This successful policy drew partly on the experience of western democracies, especially the UK. After the mid-1990s, when democratization at the national level led to the institutionalization of local democracy in Korea, the conjuncture of ongoing economic and political the urban growth politics in Korea that was both similar to and different from the case of the United States and Western Europe.

Over the 1980s, with the decentralization of planning and other authorities in France, the local politics for growth also shifted from a statist to a market-oriented pattern that more closely resembled arrangements in U.S. cities. As a number of authors have pointed out (Levine 1994; Sellers 2002), legacies of continued statism persisted even into this era. As in France, the combined effect of the institutional legacies of the Korean developmental state and democratization has generated pro-growth coalitions around the mayor rather than rentier interests. Even as the mayor increasingly occupied the pivotal position in the pro-development coalition, hierarchical supervision by supralocal governments persists. As seen in the Table 1, the newly elected mayor in Koyang endeavored to develop the city by attracting national facilities (the IEC) or

businesses (the CRC and hotels). Rentiers and local businesses became strong supporters to the mayor's policy, but their influence was limited. As a consequence, the pro-growth coalition in Koyang became a mayor-centered coalition.

At the same time, contemporary industrial development – especially in high-tech industries – spawned an educated middle-class like that of the post-industrial U.S. and Europe. This development proved crucial for the movement to limit local growth. As the developmental state creates a highly trained and technically sophisticated workforce, and houses it in new towns like Koyang, the resulting new concentrations of middle-class families shared a culture of concerns about the quality of life and a growing commitment to civic activism (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot, 1998). These residents ultimately comprise potentially powerful new constituencies of movements that take advantage of the opportunities in growth management. This balance between pro-growth coalition and growth management have not been possible with land-use control policies such as the New Town, Green Belt, and planning regulations that served under the prior regimes as a tool of authoritarian control. Adopted in the very different political context of an authoritarian state mobilized around export-led development, these policies became part of the opportunity structure under democracy that facilitated effective local challenges to local development.

[Insert Table 1 around here]

Conclusion

Multilevel analysis furnishes an explanation for both similarities of emerging growth politics in Korea to the experiences of the U.S. and other developed countries, and for enduring differences. Through the lens of this analysis, it becomes clear why forces in favor of growth management emerged immediately with the advent of planning despite at least dramatic mobilization around economic development as in earlier societies that underwent industrialization. From the emergence of urban policy to its democratization, growth management has remained much more a hallmark of urban growth politics in Korea than in most of the U.S. and even parts of Europe.

Over a period of little more than a decade, the emerging patterns of urban growth politics in Koyang resembled those in the cities of advanced economies in many respects. The Mayor, local businesses, and rentiers mobilized around developmental initiatives in a manner analogous to growth coalitions in the U.S. or France. At the same time, an understanding of the distinctive features of growth politics in Korea require at least as much attention to forces and dynamics beyond the local level alone.

From the 1990s, as urban development in Koyang produced a rapid growth in population, two shifts at the national and global levels converged. In the political arena, Korea joined the third wave of democratization, and proceeded to decentralize authorities to local governments. At the same time, with the take-off and industrialization of the national economy, the politics of urban growth shifted toward the commerce, service and high-tech orientations that older developed countries were increasingly adopting. The main consequence in the case of the IEC was the emergence of a local growth coalition under the leadership of the elected mayor. By the end of the 1990s, however, with the contestation over agricultural rezoning, civic and neighborhood

movements opposing the mayor-led development acquired widespread support within the highly educated, affluent population that increasingly dominated the local population. Through a lawsuit combined with other modes of movements, these groups succeeded in invoking national urban policies such as Green Belt to defeat the pro-growth coalition.

Quite unlike in the U.S., supralocal influence remained an important element in both sides of the subsequent contestation over urban growth. The local movements against the agricultural rezoning and the CRC drew not only on national organizations and national publicity, but on the national legislative protections inherited from the authoritarian regime. At the same time, the legacies of statism left local officials – especially the mayor – with a greater role than local business and rentiers play in the implementation of growth policies than in the U.S. (see Keating, 1991).

Rapidly industrializing economies and democratic transitions in newly developing countries provide the most favorable circumstances in which urban growth politics are likely to occur as the U.S. cities experienced. This analysis demonstrates the necessity of situating any analysis of the local politics that result in its wider global and national context. Rapid industrialization, democratization and post-industrialization on the one hand, and the legacies of state intervention and late policy development on the other, have created conditions for local growth politics in Korea that remain distinct from those of earlier industrializers. Similar multilevel influences are likely to furnish much of the explanation for the variations in urban growth politics among transitional countries as well.

References

Amsden, Alice H. (1989) *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Boschken, Herman L. (2003) Global cities, systemic power, and upper-middle-class influence. *Urban Affairs Review* 38.6, 808-830.

Castells, Manuel and Peter Hall. (1994) *Technopoles of the world: the making of 21st century industrial complexes*. Routledge, London.

Chung, Jae-Young and Richard J. R. Kirby. (2002) *The political economy of development and environment in Korea*. Routledge, London.

Clark, Terry and Vincent Hoffmann-Marinot. (1998) *The new political culture*. Westview, Boulder.

Clark, Terry (2000) Old and New paradigms for urban research: globalization and the fiscal austerity and urban innovation project. *Urban Affairs Review* 36.1, 3-45.

Evans, Peter. (2002) *Livable cities? Urban struggles for livelihood and sustainability*. University of California Press, Berkeley.

_____. (1992) The state as problem and solution: predation, embedded autonomy, and structural change. In Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.) *The politics of economic adjustment: international constraints, distributive conflicts, and the state*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Flanagan, Scott C. and Aie-Rie Lee. (2000). Value change and democratic reform in Japan and Korea. *Comparative Political Studies* 33.6, 626-659.

Fainstein, Susan S. (2001) *The city builders: property development in New York and London, 1980-2000* (2nd edition). University of Kansas Press, Lawrence.

Gershenkron, Alexander. (1962) *Economic backwardness in historical perspective*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Ha, Seong-Kyu. (1999) Urban growth and housing development in Korea: a critical overview. *Korea Journal* (Autumn), 63-93.

Hahm, Sung Deuk and L. Christopher Plein. (1995) Institutions and technological development in Korea: the role of the presidency. *Comparative Politics* 28.1, 55-76.

Harding, Alan. (1994) Urban regimes and growth machines: toward a cross-national research agenda. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 29.3, 356-382.

_____. (1995) Elite theory and growth machines. In David Judge, Gerry Stoker, and Harold Wolman (eds.) *Theories of urban politics*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Hill, Richard Child and June Woo Kim. (2000) Global cities and developmental states: New York, Tokyo, and Seoul. *Urban Studies* 37.12, 2167-2195.

Huntington, Samuel. (1991) *The third wave*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.

Keating, Michael. (1991) *Comparative urban politics*. Edward Elgar, Aldershot.

Kim, Sunhyuk. (2000) *The politics of democratization in Korea: the role of civil society*. Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh.

Koo, Hagen. (1993) Strong state and contentious society. In Hagen Koo (ed.), *State and society in contemporary Korea*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Koyang Statistics Bureau. (1997) *1996 Koyang statistics yearbook.*

_____. (1998) *1997 Koyang statistics yearbook.*

_____. (1999) *1998 Koyang statistics yearbook.*
_____. (2000) *1999 Koyang Statistics Yearbook*.
Kwon, Yong-Woo, Hwan-Jong Yoo, and Jawon Lee. (1997) *A study of the capital region*. Hanul Publications, Seoul.
Kyeong-gi Research Institute. (1998) Research on Administrative Demand and System in Metropolis in Kyeong-gi Province. Unpublished Report.
Lauria, Mickey. (1997) *Reconstructing urban regime theory: regulating urban politics in a global economy*. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Levine, Myron A. (1994) The transformation of urban politics in France: The roots of growth politics and urban regimes. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 29.3, 383-410.
Logan, John R. and H. L. Molotch. (1987) *Urban fortunes: the political economy of the place*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Molotch, H. L. (1976). The city as growth machine. *American Journal of Sociology* 82.2, 309-355.
Moon, Chung-in and Rashemi Prasad. (1994) Beyond the developmental state: networks, politics, institutions. *Governance* 7.4, 360-386.
Oh, John Kie-Chang. (1999) *Korean politics: the quest for democratization and economic development.* Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Park, Chong-min, Jae-won Yoo, Byung-Ryong Bae, Seung-Bum Choi, and Heungsok Choi. (1999) The characteristics of Korean local politics. *Korean Journal of Public Administration*. 33.2, 123-139.
Pempel, T. J. (1999) The developmental regime in a changing world economy. In Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.). *The developmental state*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Pierre, Jon (2005) Comparative urban governance: uncovering complex causalities. *Urban Affairs Review* 40.4, 446-462.
Rempel, Michael, and Terry Clark. (1997) Post-Industrial politics: a framework for interpreting citizen politics since the 1960s. In Terry Clark and Michael Rempel (eds.) *Citizen politics in post-industrial societies*. Westview, Boulder.
Sassen, Sasskia. (2001) *Global networks: linked cities.* Routledge, London.
Sellers, Jefferey M. (2005) Re-placing the nation: an agenda for comparative urban politics. *Urban Affairs Review* 40.4, 419-445.
_____. (2002a) The nation-state and urban governance: toward multi-level analysis. *Urban Affairs Review* 34.3, 372-396.
_____. (2002b) *Governing from below: urban regions and the global economy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Shatkin, Gavin. (2004) Globalization and local leadership: growth, power and politics in Thailand's eastern seaboard. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 28.1, 11-26.
Stone, Clarence N. (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988*. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence.
Wolman, Harold, and Michael Goldsmith. (1992) *Urban politics and policy: a comparative approach*. Blackwell press, London.

Woo-Cumings, Meredith. (1995) Developmental bureaucracy in comparative perspective: the evolution of the Korean civil service. In Hyung-Ki Kim, Michio Muramatsu, T. J. Pempel, and Kozo Yamamura (eds.), *The Japanese civil service and economic development*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

World Bank. (1993) *The East Asian miracle: economic growth and public policy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Wu, Fulong, (2003). Globalization, place promotion, and urban development in Shanghai. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 25.1, 55-78.

Zhang, Tingwei. (2002) Urban development and a socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai. *Urban Affairs Review* 37.4, 475-499.



Note: The percentage = urban population / total population.
Source: World Bank (2004), World Development Indicator

Figure 1. Urban population in OECD countries



Source: Kyeong-gi Research Institute (1998)

Figure 2. Rapid Growth of Population in SMA cities

	Koyang New Town	International Exhibition Center	Rezoning Agricultural Area	Commercial and Residential Complex
Time Period	1989-1996	1989-1999 (mainly after mid-1990s)	1999-2000	1999-present
Policy Goals	Relieve urban congestion, house workers	Attracting International Exhibition Center	Rezoning agricultural area and constructing international-level hotels	Constructing commercial and residential complex
Supralocal Influence	Central government's decision	1. Restricted development regulations and growth management policies. 2. Supervision from higher governments (central and provincial government). 3. Limited authority of mayor: budget limitation, and regulations.		
Pro-growth Actors	Central government (ministries)	Almost all city residents National Assembly members Kyeong-gi Province	Mayor Rentiers City council members (old town districts) Local construction companies	Mayor Old town residents (rentiers) Yojin Construction companies (national level company)
Anti-growth Actors	None	Citizen movement leaders (small numbers)	Citizen movement leaders New town residents Religious, environmental leaders City council members (new town districts)	Citizen movement leaders New town residents
Local Business Power	(Not involved)	Weak	Weak	Weak
Permission of the Project	National ministries	National Ministries (MCIE, KOTRA)	City mayor	City mayor
Types of Local Coalition	N/A	Mayor-centered coalition (Mayor + rentiers, weak business)		
Policy Outcome	Success	Success	Failure (Citizen Lawsuit)	Pending (Citizen Lawsuit)

Table 1. An analysis of the cases